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Z 161337Z NOV 74

FM [REDACTED] 25x1

DIA REVIEWED 01-Dec-2010: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

REFER TO DOS

DOS REVIEWED 21-Dec-2010: NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED

TO DIA WASH DC
 CJCS WASH DC
 THE WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
 SECSTATE WASHDC
 USCINCEUR/VAHINGEN GER
 USNMR SHAPE/BEL
 CINCUSNAVEUR/LONDON ENG

S E C R E T/SPECCAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG GRAHAM, INFO GEN BROWN,

GEN SCOWCROFT, SECSTATE, GEN EADE, GEN GOODPASTER/HAIG, AND
 ADM SHEAR, FROM BG GUARY. //0739 NOV 74 SECTION 1 OF 2
 SUBJ: MEETING WITH FIELD MARSHAL ISMAIL ALY AND CHIEF
 OF STAFF LT GEN GAMASY (U)

1. (SNF) DURING 30-MINUTE DISCUSSION JUST PRIOR TO FIELD MARSHAL
 ISMAIL ALY'S DEPARTURE TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT SADAT, COVERED THE
 FOLLOWING ITEMS: FIELD MARSHAL'S PLANNED TRIP TO US; EGYPTIAN
 EVALUATION OF ISRAELI INTENT; EGYPTIAN EVALUATION OF SYRIAN INTENT;
 COMMAND AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY OF EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN HIGH
 COMMAND; AND, SECURITY OF TASK FORCE 85 PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.
 GENERAL GAMASY, CHIEF OF STAFF EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES WAS ALSO
 PRESENT.

2. (SNF) PURPOSE OF SCHEDULED MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE
 PRIVATE VISIT BY THE FM TO THE US. TWO DAYS AGO EMBASSY PROCESSED
 PASSPORT FOR FM, HIS WIFE, HIS SECRETARY, AN PHYSICIAN. FIELD
 MARSHAL ADVISED HE INTENDED TO GO TO LONDON SOON FOR A
 CHECK-UP. IF HE WAS SATISFIED, HE WOULD PROBABLY GO TO THE US
 ON A PRIVATE VISIT SINCE HIS SON IS THIRD SECRETARY AT THE
 EGYPTIAN EMBASSY. IF HE IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF
 HIS LONDON CHECK-UP, HE IS CONSIDERING FURTHER MEDICAL TREATMENT
 IN THE US. IN ANY EVENT, HE WILL ADVISE ME OF HIS ULTIMATE
 INTENTIONS. I TOLD FM WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO ASSIST HIM IN ANYWAY
 POSSIBLE, TO WHICH HE REPLIED THAT OUR FRIENDSHIP PERMITS HIM
 TO ADVISE ME THAT IF HIS HEALTH PERMITTED, HE WOULD BE
 WILLING TO MEET WITH APPROPRIATE US MILITARY OFFICIALS ON A

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VERY PRIVATE BASIS. HE STATED THAT HE DEPENDED UPON ME TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. THE FM ALSO STATED THAT HE HELD A LETTER FROM US PRESIDENT'S PHYSICIAN WHOSE NAME HE COULD NOT RECALL, ADVISING THAT HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE FM IF THE FM FELT HE COULD BE OF ASSISTANCE. THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSION WAS SUDDENLY TERMINATED WHEN FM STATED I CAN ONLY HOLD YOU UNTIL 1230 SINCE I MUST LEAVE WITH GEN GAMASY TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WE HAVE, I BELIEVE, SOME BUSINESS TO CONDUCT CONCERNING CURRENT EVENTS. TO SAVE TIME, I WISH YOU WOULD TELL ME WHAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO COVER. IN RESPONSE, I TOLD HIM I WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR FRIENDSHIP AND HOPE THAT HE COULD ANSWER SOME QUESTIONS WHICH HE MIGHT PREFER TO DEFER AND THEN PROCEEDED TO COVER ITEMS LISTED ABOVE AS TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION.

3. (SNF) AT THIS POINT, OUR DISCUSSION WAS INTERRUPTED BY GEN GAMASY WHO INSISTED ON KNOWING WHY WE HAD CANCELLED OUR SCHEDULED OLIVE HARVEST MISSION THIS DATE. I INFORMED THAT WEATHER WAS THE CAUSE OF THE CANCELLATION. AT THIS POINT, BOTH CHUCKLED AND SAID THEY HAD COMPLETED THEIR RECONNAISSANCE THIS MORNING AND HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE WEATHER. GAMASY SAID WE WANT THOSE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS BECAUSE THEY PROVE OUR POINT WE HAVE NOT AND WE WILL NOT VIOLATE THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT UNLESS FORCED TO DO SO. I INFORMED GAMASY AT THIS POINT THAT WE SCHEDULED A FLIGHT FOR TOMORROW, 17 NOVEMBER, ASKING HIM TO KEEP THE INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL RATHER THAN DISRUPT OUR CURRENT OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES. BOTH AGREED AND SEEMED SATISFIED WITH THE STATEMENT.

4. (SNF) EGYPTIAN EVALUATION OF ISRAELI INTENT. FM STATED THAT MORE THAN SEVENTY PERCENT OF THE ISRAELI RESERVES HAVE BEEN CALLED UP TO ACTIVE DUTY. IT IS THIS CONTENTION THAT ISRAELIS CANNOT FUNCTION FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME WITH THIS TYPE OF MOBILIZED MANPOWER; HENCE, EGYPTIANS EVALUATE THAT ISRAELIS ARE NOT TAKING SUCH DRASTIC STEPS FOR NOTHING. UNFORTUNATELY, THE FM STATED, THE SAME SITUATION IS OCCURRING IN SYRIA. BOTH ARE SAYING THE SAME THING--THAT THEY FEAR AN ATTACK ON EACH OTHER; SOME ACTION MUST BE TAKEN TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION. LATER ON, HE RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT AND AS COULD BE EXPECTED, STATED YOU CANNOT BLAME SYRIA FOR TAKING THE PRECAUTIONS NECESSARY AGAINST A SEVENTY PERCENT MOBILIZATION OF A COUNTRY WHICH CANNOT CONTINUE TO FUNCTION WITH SUCH NUMBERS UNDER ARMS.

5. (SNF) EGYPTIAN EVALUATION OF SYRIAN INTENT. EGYPTIANS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SYRIANS INTEND TO ATTACK ISRAEL BUT BECAUSE OF THE FEAR WHICH HAS RESULTED FROM ISRAELI ACTIVITY, NOT ONLY ITS MOBILIZATION BUT ITS TROOP MOVEMENTS, THERE IS A CHANCE THAT THE SYRIANS WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO REACT DEFENSIVELY. FM STATED THAT HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SYRIANS WOULD INITIATE

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HOSTILITIES UNLESS THEY FELT THAT THEY WERE PUT IN A POSITION WHERE THEY WERE FORCED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES.

6. (SNF) COMMAND AND CONTROL OF COMBINED COMMAND. FM STATED HE HAD AUTHORIZED AND SIGNED CONTINGENCY PLANS WHICH PROVIDE FOR SYRIAN DEFENSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST ATTACK. THESE PLANS AUTHORIZE AN IMMEDIATE SYRIAN REACTION IN THE CONTEXT THAT ANY COMMANDER MUST TAKE ACTION NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF HIS TROOPS. YOU SHOULD KNOW, HE ADDED, THAT WE HAVE CENTRALIZED COMMAND FOR PLANNING PURPOSES AND A DECENTRALIZED COMMAND FOR EXECUTION. THE HIGH COMMAND FOR WHICH I AM RESPONSIBLE ON THE MILITARY SIDE IS IN FACT NOT A MILITARY HIGH COMMAND BUT A POLITICAL HIGH COMMAND. THE PRESIDENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES MUST ACT IN CONSULTATION WITH EACH OTHER. GEN GAMASY INTERJECTED HIMSELF AT THIS POINT AND STATED YOU MUST CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT WHAT WE ARE SAYING IS THAT CONTINGENCY PLANS DO EXIST, AUTHORIZING THE SYRIANS
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S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG GRAHAM, INFO GEN BROWN,

GEN SCOWCROFT, SECSTATE, GEN EADE, GEN GOODPASTER/HAIG, AND
 ADM SHEAR, FROM BG GUAY, 0739 NOV 74 SECTION 2 OF 2
 TO REACT AGAINST ATTACK AND THERE MUST BE NO DOUBT IN YOUR MIND
 THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY BY VIRTUE OF THIS ORGANIZATION
 TO ACT UNILATERALLY EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE. THERE MUST BE NO
 DOUBT, HE CONTINUED, IN THE MINDS OF US MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
 LEADERS THAT THIS COMMAND STRUCTURE DOES NOT INCLUDE PROVISIONS
 FOR UNILATERAL OFFENSIVE ACTION. THE ORGANIZATION REQUIRES PRIOR
 CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS BEFORE A POSITIVE DECISION
 CAN BE MADE. IN THIS REGARD, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THERE HAS
 BEEN NO SUCH CONSULTATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRESIDENT
 ASAD UP UNTIL NOW. AFTER WE FINISH OUR MEETING WITH THE
 PRESIDENT, THERE MAY BE SUCH CONSULTATION.

7. (BNF) AT THIS POINT, FM SAID, I WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE
 OF OUR PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP AND OUR RELATIONSHIP AND ASK YOU
 YOUR PERSONAL IMPRESSION AND EVALUATION OF THE FOLLOWING TWO
 QUESTIONS: WILL ISRAEL ACT AGAINST EGYPT? AND WILL ISRAEL ACT
 AGAINST SYRIA? STRESSING THAT MY ANSWER WAS PERSONAL AND NOT
 OFFICIAL, AND WAS BASED ON LIMITED INFORMATION, I STATED THE
 FOLLOWING: GIVEN THE USUAL EFFORT OF THE US GOVERNMENT TO
 DEFUSE THE CURRENT TENSIONS IN THE
 MIDDLE EAST AND THE PERSONAL INTERVENTION OF DR. KISSINGER
 WHICH INCLUDED ASSURANCES TO YOUR PRESIDENT THAT THE UNITED
 STATES WOULD NOT TOLERATE A PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION ON THE PART OF
 ISRAEL, I FEEL AT THIS POINT THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT ACT AGAINST
 EITHER EGYPT OR SYRIA. THIS IS MY HONEST OPINION. IT IS BASED

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PRIMARILY ON THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE WELL AWARE OF THEIR LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; I CANNOT BELIEVE AND WOULD HOPE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT SO EMOTIONAL AS TO TAKE A DECISION WHICH WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THEIR LONG-TERM INTERESTS, RECOGNIZING THAT US OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE OPINION WOULD BE UNFAVORABLE TO THEM AND SO DOING RISK ALIENATING US GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND SUFFER THE SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF SUPPORT. I TERMINATED MY ANSWER BY ADDING THAT I HAD GIVEN THEM A PRIVATE PERSONAL OPINION BASED ON OUR STRONG FRIENDSHIP WHICH HE HAD DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS. BOTH OFFICERS APPEARED SATISFIED AND SEEMED TO APPRECIATE THESE REASSURANCES.

8. IN TERMINATING OUR DISCUSSION, GEN GAMASY REITERATED HIS EARLIER STATEMENT CONCERNING THE LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY COMMAND LEADERSHIP. HE THEN SAID HE FEARED THE ISRAELIS ARE USING THE UNITED STATES AND ARE ENGAGED IN A DECEPTION PLAN WHICH INCLUDES POLITICAL DECEPTION JUST AS THE EGYPTIANS DID IN OCTOBER 73, ADDING HE HOPED HE WAS WRONG. THE FM THEN AGAIN REITERATED HE ASSURES US THAT EGYPT HAS NOT VIOLATED THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. HE STATED QUOTE WE INFORMED THE UNEF OF OUR EXERCISES; WE DID PUT A FEW TANKS ACROSS THE EASTERN BANKS; WE WITHDREW THEM THE SAME DAY AND IN LIGHT OF UNEF PROTESTATIONS, HAVE CONDUCTED NO FURTHER EXERCISES ON THE EAST BANK WHICH VIOLATE THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT A SITUATION WHICH INVOLVED OFFENSIVE ACTION WOULD REQUIRE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. END QUOTE. THE OBVIOUS CONCLUSION IS THAT THIS CONSULTATION WOULD THEN REQUIRE FURTHER EVALUATION BEFORE A DECISION COULD BE MADE CONCERNING ACTION TO BE TAKEN.

9. (SNF) SECURITY OF TASK FORCE 65 PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. AT THIS POINT, I TOLD THE FM THAT JUST AS HE WAS CONCERNED OVER HIS TROOPS I WAS SURE I WOULD RECEIVE INQUIRIES CONCERNING OUR EVALUATION OF THE SECURITY OF TASK FORCE 65 AND USS BOULDER AND RELATED EQUIPMENT. HIS RETORT WAS: ARE YOU ASKING ME FOR A GUARANTEE? I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. HE THEN STATED. YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT WE WILL PROTECT YOUR PEOPLE IN THE CANAL. WITH YOUR HELP, WE WILL NOT NEED TO CONCERN OURSELVES THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT WILL ATTACK THEM. GEN GAMASY THEN ECHOED THE FM'S STATEMENT AND FOR THE FIRST TIME MADE A NOTATION IN HIS NOTEBOOK WHICH HE EXPLAINED INDICATED THE FM GUARANTEED THE SECURITY OF THE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT OF TASK FORCE 65.

COMMENT: (SNF) I HAVE USED SPECCAT DISTRIBUTION ON THIS MESSAGE BECAUSE OF THE OBVIOUS SENSITIVITY AND THE FEAR THAT ANY LEAK WOULD COMPROMISE MY RELATIONSHIP WITH ISMAIL ALY AND GAMASY. IN THE DAYS TO COME, THIS RELATIONSHIP MAY BE WELL WORTH THE INVESTMENT WE HAVE SO FAR MADE. ALSO, PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN AT THE ONSET OF THIS MEETING AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT TOMORROW'S ARABIC PRESS WILL REFLECT THAT THE FM MET

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WITH THE US DEFENSE ATTACHE ON THIS DATE. WITH RESPECT TO THEIR
INSISTANCE THAT THEY HAVE NOT VIOLATED THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT
AND IN VIEW OF REPORTING TO THIS EFFECT, BELIEVE IT NOTEWORTHY
THAT IN THEIR MINDS EGYPTIANS MAY CONSIDER SHORT TERM EXERCISES
WHICH INVOLVED CROSSING OF SOME EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL AS NOT
VIOLATING THE AGREEMENT, PROVIDING EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL ARE
RETURNED ON THE SAME DAY. AMBASSADOR INFORMED.

WARM REGARDS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

Z 160305Z NOV 74
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHOC FLASH 0268
BT
SECRET CAIRO 9245

CONTROL: 4620Q
RECD: 16 NOV '74, 11:00PM

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E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: REPORTED MILITARY OPERATIONS

REF: STATE 252665

1. REFTEL RECEIVED 0215 LOCAL. SINCE THE PRESIDENT IS AT THE BARRAGES, I IMMEDIATELY CALLED FAHMY ON THE SECURE PHONE AND TOLD HIM ABOUT YOUR MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. I ASKED HOW I COULD GET IT TO THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT DELAY. HE SEEMED A BIT SURPRISED THAT THE SITUATION HAD REACHED THE POINT WHERE SUCH A MESSAGE WAS WARRANTED. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER THE GOI HAD INFORMED YOU OF THE PARTIAL MOBILIZATION OR WHETHER "YOUR PEOPLE" HAD PICKED IT UP. I TOLD HIM THE GOI HAD TOLD US ABOUT THE CALL UP OF SEVERAL THOUSAND RESERVISTS AND DESCRIBED IT AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE PROMPTED BY WHAT THEY BELIEVE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SYRIANS MAY BE PREPARING FOR WAR. FAHMY RECALLED HE HAD TOLD US FOUR OR FIVE DAYS AGO THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE QUIETLY CALLING UP SMALL GROUPS OF RESERVISTS.

2. FAHMY THEN UNDERTOOK TO ASCERTAIN IF THE PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY RETIRED. A SHORT WHILE LATER, HE CALLED BACK AND ASKED THAT I BRING HIM A COPY OF THE MESSAGE SO THAT HE COULD FORWARD IT TO THE PRESIDENT. ACCORDINGLY, I WENT TO HIS APARTMENT WHERE WE DISCUSSED THE MATTER UNTIL A FEW MINUTES AGO (0400 LOCAL). FAHMY READ THE MESSAGE CAREFULLY AND TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENT BY PHONE ABOUT ITS CONTENTS. THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION HAD BEEN THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER ISRAELI "CRY WOLF" SITUATION SUCH AS WE EXPERIENCED SOME MONTHS AGO. THE PRESIDENT HAD NOTED THAT ASAD COULD NOT ACT ON HIS OWN AND, IF ASAD CONTEMPLATED HOSTILITIES, WOULD FIRST HAVE TO COORDINATE WITH THE EGYPTIANS OR AT LEAST INFORM THEM. THERE HAD BEEN NO EXCHANGES EITHER ON A POLITICAL OR A MILITARY LEVEL ON THE SUBJECT. THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN THE MESSAGE "VERY CALMLY." FAHMY ADDED THAT IF THE SYRIANS MOVE WITHOUT FIRST COORDINATING WITH THE EGYPTIANS, EGYPT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO ASSIST THEM AND WILL NOT DO SO.

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SECRET*Department of State***TELEGRAM**

-2- CAIRO 9245, NOV 16

3. WHILE FAHMY TOO VOICED SCEPTICISM, HE ANALYZED POSSIBLE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI POLITICAL MOTIVES IN CONSIDERING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. ON THE SYRIAN SIDE, (A) THEIR DECISION COMMUNICATED TO WALDHEIM LAST THURSDAY NOT TO RENEW UNDOF, (B) THE HEADY EFFECTS OF THE RABAT CONFERENCE, (C) ISRAEL'S RECENT POLITICAL DEFEAT AT THE UNGA IN CONNECTION WITH THE PLO, (D) POSSIBLE INTERNAL PRESSURES ON ASAD, AND (E) THE UPCOMING MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND BREZHNEV MIGHT ALL BE FACTORS PROMPTING THE SYRIANS TO CONSIDER A LIMITED ACTION. ON THE ISRAELI SIDE, (A) A DESIRE TO DISTRACT PUBLIC OPINION FROM THEIR SERIOUS ECONOMIC CRISIS BY FOCUSING ON AN ALLEGED SYRIAN THREAT, (B) PIQUE OVER THE RABAT SUMMIT AND UNGA VOTE, (C) A DESIRE TO PRE-EMPT THE CURRENT PALESTINE DEBATE AND (D) HEAVY US ARMS SHIPMENTS, MIGHT ALL BE FACTORS DICTATING A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE. ON BALANCE, IN FAHMY'S OPINION, ISRAEL IS THE MORE LIKELY OF THE TWO TO BE CONSIDERING PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION AS FURTHERING ITS IMMEDIATE INTERESTS. HOWEVER, FAHMY TOOK NOTE OF YOUR COMMENT THAT GOI HAS TOLD US THAT ITS MOVES ARE OF A DEFENSIVE, PRECAUTIONARY NATURE AND THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF LAUNCHING ANY ATTACK ON SYRIA. HE ALSO NOTED YOUR REITERATED ASSURANCE THAT USG WILL OPPOSE A PRE-EMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION BY ISRAEL.

4. FAHMY ALSO DOUBTED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE URGING THE SYRIANS TO RESUME HOSTILITIES. GOE HAD JUST RECEIVED TWO MESSAGES FROM BREZHNEV, NEITHER OF WHICH REFERRED TO CURRENT ISRAELI-SYRIAN TENSIONS. BREZHNEV HAD ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO HIS UPCOMING SUMMIT WITH SADAT, SPOKE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF AN EARLY RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND INDICATED HE INTENDS TO RAISE THE MIDDLE EAST DURING HIS UPCOMING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FORD.

5. FAHMY SAID THAT AN EFFORT WILL BE MADE LATER TODAY TO CHECK OUT, THROUGH EGYPTIAN MILITARY CHANNELS, SYRIAN INTENTIONS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION. HE WOULD LET US KNOW THE RESULTS ASAP. MEANWHILE, HE SUGGESTED THAT NOT ONLY SHOULD ASAD BE CAUTIONED, BUT ISRAEL SHOULD ALSO BE "WARNED" BY USG THAT A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST SYRIA WILL NOT BE TOLERATED.

EILTS

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